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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights… …1 
 
1 Background to the study 
 
Montesquieu, in L’Esprit des Lois,2 1748, divided the functions of state into: the legislative power; 
the executive power, and the power of judging.3 Indeed, three constitutional organs have invariably 
dominated state power. These are; the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. According to 
Montesquieu, the state is said to be at ‘equilibrium’ when the three organs are independent of each 
other, with each carrying out its functions without interference. Ideally, the legislative organ ought 
to make laws, the executive to implement them, and the judiciary to adjudicate over disputes 
arising out of the day-to-day operations of the state.4 
 
This attempt at dispersing state power is not arbitrary. It has got ends. One cardinal end in 
this regard is the protection of fundamental human rights. It has been argued that where the three 
organs of state are allowed operational autonomy, individuals stand to enjoy relatively profound 
liberty.5 Where state functions are entrusted with one person or organ, the tyranny of that person 
or organ is certain to overwhelm the realisation of fundamental freedoms and liberties. The French 
philosopher himself prescribed that:6 
 
Political liberty is to be found … only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience 
shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it 
will go… To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the nature of things that one power should be a 
check on another… When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or 
body… there can be no liberty… Again, there is no liberty if the judicial power is not separated from 
the legislative and the executive… There would be an end of everything if the same person or body, 




                                                 
1  T Jefferson ‘The declaration of independence’ in RB Morris (ed) Morris significant documents in the United 
States history (1969) 105. 
2  For an English version, see B de Montesquieu The spirit of laws trans T Nugent (1949). 
3  Montesquieu (n 2 above) xi, 4. 
4  There are still many contemporary writings on the doctrine of separation of powers. See, RC Sarvis ‘Legislative 
delegation and two conceptions of the legislative power’ (2006) Pierce Law Review 317; Also KE Whittington ‘Madison 
has left the building’ (2005) Summer University of Chicago Law Review.  
5  Mr. Justice Frankfurter Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952).   
6   Montesquieu (n 2 above) xi, 4. 
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Locke had written long before Montesquieu that:7 
 
It may be too great a temptation to humane frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons who 
have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they 
may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making 
and execution, to their private advantage.  
 
Both Montesquieu and Locke had tremendous faith in the tripartite government structure in so far 
as the protection of liberties was concerned.8 Informed by this philosophy, most democratic 
constitutions have weaved state power in almost similar terms envisioned by Montesquieu. Thus 
far, the 1787 Constitution of the United States of America (USA) could be ranked as one with the 
clearest distinction of state functions.9 
 
Contemporary practice, however, appears to be in favour of complementing these 
traditional state organs, a sign, perhaps, that the conventional three organs of state per se have 
increasingly proved inadequate; at least in the sphere of human rights protection.10 There is a 
move, or rather, wave towards the establishment of independent national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs) to reinforce the bulwark of human rights protection mechanisms at state level, and the 
wave, arguably, is most pronounced in Africa.11 A writer has, thus, documented this development:12 
 
During the 1990s there was an exponential increase in the establishment of national human rights 
institutions in Africa. As recently as 1989, only one African country had established some form of 
human rights monitoring body. By the beginning of 2000, twenty-four African countries had 
provisions in their laws for national human rights bodies. 
 
The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) must have been alive to this 
reality when it reckoned:13    
 
It has therefore become increasingly apparent that the effective enjoyment of human rights calls for 
the establishment of national infrastructures for their protection and promotion. Official human rights 





                                                 
7  J Locke Second treatise of civil government (1690) ch xii, 143. 
8  In L Fisher American constitutional law (1990) 217, it is noted: ‘It is often said that powers are separated to 
preserve liberties.’  
9  See, AW Bradley & KD Ewing Constitutional and administrative law (1993) 155., where the Constitution of the 
USA is hailed as having observed a strict adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers. 
10  It is instructive that institutions autonomous from the main organs of the state have also been found necessary 
in such areas as election management, anti corruption campaign and central banking. 
11  See, ME Tsekos ‘Human rights institutions in Africa’ (2002) 21 Human Rights Brief 21. But the development is 
not unique to Africa. See, C Evans ‘Human rights commissions and religious conflict in the Asia-Pacific region’ (2004) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 713. 
12 Tsekos (n 11 above) 21. 
13  National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.19, para 7. 
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The emergence of these NHRIs has been hailed:14 
 
It is therefore important for a state committed to human rights to establish a national infrastructure, 
including relevant institutions, which can promote and protect human rights.  
 
1.1 Research questions 
 
Granted, there seems to be a sufficient case for the establishment of NHRIs. Behind the facade, 
that is this noble invention, however, are numerous disturbing questions vying for answers. Some 
of the most challenging could be cited.  
 
Firstly, the establishment of these mostly autonomous autochthonous institutions raises the 
question as to whether the original tripartite system of checks and balances, praised by 
Montesquieu and a host of legal and political philosophers, has proved inadequate, in the 
protection of human rights, and hence the need for complementary bodies. This issue has, again, 
not eluded the UNHCHR as evidenced by the following excerpt:15 
 
There are some who see no good reason for establishing special national machinery devoted to the 
protection and promotion of human rights. They may argue that these bodies are not a wise use of 
scarce resources and that an independent judiciary and democratically elected parliament are 
sufficient to ensure that human rights abuses do not occur in the first place.  
 
Secondly, there is apparently no clear consensus how NHRIs should plug into the socket that is 
the traditional three organs of the state. In this regard, two principal questions fight for supremacy. 
Are NHRIs envisaged to compose a fourth organ of state? How should these bastions of human 
rights relate to the other established organs of state? Connected to this are numerous other 
nagging questions. Are these institutions meant to investigate, for instance, judicial officers, heads 
of government or even members of parliament? Should they be empowered to influence traditional 
executive prerogatives such as the signing of - and reporting on - especially human rights treaties? 
How would these human rights bodies, mostly composed of unelected persons, participate in 
policy formulation? Should they? And do they? How would these institutions influence legislation 
and how does this augur with the concept of representative democracy? How much quasi-judicial 
power should NHRIs wield? 
 
Thirdly, the problem of accountability of NHRIs has yet to attract a convincing panacea. It 
is, indeed, paradoxical that institutions endowed with enormous powers to check others should, 
themselves, have no corresponding effective checks. Already, commentators have noted the 
weaknesses inherent in the existing accountability mechanisms for these nascent citadels of 
                                                 
14   National Human Rights Institutions Best Practice ‘National Human Rights as an Integral part of a Democratic 
Society’, para 1. Commonwealth Secretariat, London. 
15  n 13 above. 
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human rights. Of accountability of NHRIs in Eastern and Southern Commonwealth Africa, a 
scholarly contribution has observed:16 
 
At present, most national institutions are required to send a copy of their annual report to parliament 
and/or to the head of state/government and this supposedly provides a detailed account of its 
performance. In practice such reports are frequently disappointing with little meaningful data on, or 
information about, the institution’s operation. Furthermore, there are often lengthy delays in 
publication resulting in reports often out of date before they are even published. Even then, there is 
no obligation on parliament to debate the report and it appears that almost invariably they are 
effectively ignored.    
 
1.2 Presumptions and limitations of study  
 
Like any other piece of academic work, this study makes assumptions; and deductions based on 
these assumptions. For instance, it is presumed that while modern constitutions may vary from 
state to state, most democratic constitutions in the Commonwealth will endeavour to at least 
secure three distinguishable organs of state, albeit with varying degrees of powers and autonomy. 
Each constitution would usually espouse a different nuance of the concept of separation of powers. 
Further, the study presumes that most Commonwealth constitutions in Africa, even if remotely, 
have taken after the Westminster constitutional model. Another presupposition is that the efficacy 
of NHRIs in the protection of human rights has very much suffered a structural problem and that 
the situation pleads for address. The Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (Paris 
Principles)17 are considered to be authoritative standards in the NHRIs discourse and it is against 
the backdrop of these standards that the hospitality of the Westminster model to the new bodies is 
assessed. 
 
The study is limited to Commonwealth Africa, although examples may be drawn from other 
jurisdictions.   
 
1.3 Research methodologies 
 
Clearly, a non-empirical research methodology would do for this kind of investigation. In addition, 
primary as well as secondary sources of data are consulted.   
 
1.4 Literature survey 
 
This piece does not pretend to pioneer research in the sphere of government functions (the 
doctrine of separation of powers) and neither is it set to be the first to extensively study NHRIs in 
                                                 
16  J Hatchard et al Comparative constitutionalism and good governance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and 
Southern perspective (2004) 219. 
17  Adopted by the General Assembly through resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. 
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Commonwealth Africa. Phillips and Jackson,18 Wade and Bradley19 and other writers of 
constitutional and administrative law have had occasion to discuss the concept of separation of 
powers as it manifests itself in modern constitutions and especially in the United Kingdom (UK). De 
Smith is also prominent in this respect.20 In Commonwealth Africa, Nwabueze21 and Ghai and 
McAuslan22 are established authorities. Of course, Dicey,23 Montesquieu,24 Locke,25 and Aristotle,26 
in their respective works, laid the philosophical bases that continue to inform state constitutions to 
date.  
 
As regards NHRIs, the Paris Principles stand out as the most influential inspiration for the 
establishment of human rights bodies in domestic jurisdictions. These guidelines prescribe the role, 
composition and structure of NHRIs, and are only meant to serve as ideals to which state 
constitutions ought to aspire. A landmark in this sphere is a publication titled, Protectors or 
Pretenders? Government National Human Rights Institutions.27 This publication focuses on the 
performance of NHRIs given the investment of the United Nations (UN) in this venture. The 
research finds that most NHRIs in Africa are ‘pretenders’ and that it is time the UN reconsidered its 
mostly unquestioned investment.  
 
Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offices: National Experiences throughout 
the World,28 narrates the experiences of the various kinds of NHRIs established in the various 
states. It is an attempt to discover how NHRIs have faired in diverse states such as Cameroon, 
Ghana, India, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Namibia, Sweden, Zambia, et cetera. The study has 
little relation to government functions, except a chapter on NHRIs in a federal structure of 
government. The International Council on Human Rights Policy has also published a report, which 
examines the degree to which NHRIs are successful in carrying out their mandate to promote 
human rights and protect the rights of citizens.29 The study looks at how NHRIs in different 
countries and contexts are acquiring legitimacy and a reputation of effectiveness. Hatchard, Ndulo 
and Slinn’s, Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Commonwealth: An 
Eastern and Southern African Perspective,30 carries a detailed account of NHRIs in the specified 
region. This publication is a general assessment of NHRIs and exhibits no particular bias.  
                                                 
18  P Jackson & P Leopold, Constitutional and administrative law (2001). 
19   Bradley & Ewing (n 9 above). 
20  S de Smith Constitution and administrative law (1977).    
21 BO Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the emergent states (1973); BO Nwabueze Presidentialism in 
commonwealth Africa (1974). 
22  YP Ghai & B McAuslan Public law and political change in Kenya: A study of the legal framework of government 
from colonial times to the present (1970).   
23  AV Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution (1885). 
24  Montesquieu (n 2 above). 
25  Locke (n 7 above). 
26  JD Kaplan (ed) The pocket Aristotle trans WD Ross (1958).  
27  Human Rights Watch (2001). 
28  K Hossain et al (eds) Human rights commissions and ombudsman offices: National experiences throughout the 
world (2000).  
29  Performance and legitimacy: National human rights institutions International Council on Human Rights (2000). 
30  Hatchard et al (n 16 above). See ch 10. 
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The current contribution is unique in that it seeks to assess the doctrine of separation of 
powers with a view to seeing whether it is receptive to NHRIs enacted in compliance with the Paris 
Principles. It is a theoretical investigation that delves into the conceptual foundations of both the 
tripartite doctrine and NHRIs. There are, evidently, less writings on NHRIs as they relate to the 
other government functions, which is the principal focus of the current investigation. Hence, this 
study should not be seen as superfluous, less at all as extravagant.  
 
1.5 Chapter breakdown 
 
The current investigation will be completed in four distinct chapters. The current chapter serves 
well to introduce the study. The second chapter constitutes a comprehensive study of the 
conceptual foundations of NHRIs. The essence, structure and nature of NHRIs is also explored. 
The third chapter proposes to analyse the doctrine of separation of powers from a philosophical 
and later, from a practical point of view as it manifests itself in the Commonwealth tradition. The 
tripartite government configuration is discussed with the ramification of NHRIs in mind. It is 
instructive that without assessing the parent concept (the rule of law) a discussion on separation of 
powers remains orphaned. The fourth chapter shall first allude to the new challenges to human 
rights enforcement: It shall then discuss how these challenges and the development of NHRIs cry 
for a new thinking on the original tripartite system. The final section is an attempt at supplying a 























The evolution of NHRIs: An analytical history 
 
Nevertheless, the Principles so established seem intangible, mainly because they were 
solemnly endorsed by the General Assembly, but especially because a ‘revision’ or 
‘reinterpretation’, even with the best intentions in the world, would open Pandora’s box. It is 
mainly a matter of avoiding confusion, as national institutions are by definition at the crossing 




The previous chapter hinted that, invariably, state functions have traditionally anchored on a three-
legged superstructure composing; the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. These organs 
have had distinct roles conventionally allotted them, one cardinal end being the protection of 
liberties. In the last two decades, however, states appear to have developed interest in 
complementing these traditional organs ostensibly to secure more protection for human rights.32 
The bodies that have emerged to reinforce the bulwark of human rights enforcement mechanisms 
have taken the form of human rights commissions, ombudsmen offices or more specialised 
institutions, for instance, on racial discrimination or gender equality. It is not uncommon to find 
hybrid bodies exhibiting a mixture of these traits. Indeed, Reif defines NHRIs as ombudsmen, 
human rights commissions or hybrid human rights ombudsmen.33 It has been possible to compare 
and contrast these classes of bodies:34 
 
These institutions have similar characteristics; neither institution is judicial in nature nor has 
lawmaking abilities. Rather, both institutions play an ongoing advisory role regarding human rights 
matters, at both the national and international levels. The main difference between the two 
institutions is that an ombudsman’s primary role is to monitor human rights abuses perpetrated by 
government entities, while a human rights commission generally addresses the actions of private 
entities and individuals as well as government conduct.  
 
An analytical discussion of the evolution of these bodies at the UN level constitutes the current 
chapter. The ends of the chapter are twofold. Firstly, the study aspires to examine the role and 
                                                 
31  E Decaux ‘Evolution and perspective for national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights: 
Their contribution to the prevention of human rights violations’ LA Sicilianos (ed) The prevention of human rights 
violations (2001) 236. 
32  See, AE Pohjolainen The evolution of national human rights institutions: The role of the United Nations (2006) 2.  
33  LC Reif ‘Building democratic institutions: The role of national human rights institutions in good governance and 
human rights protection’ (2000) Spring Harvard Human Rights Journal  2. 
34  Tsekos (n 11 above) 21.  
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nature of NHRIs. To represent the various conceptions of NHRIs at the different epochs, a 
historical account is thought wise.  
 
2.1 Role and nature of NHRIs: A historical account 
 
2.1.1 The Swedish Ombudsman: The cradle? 
Sweden is often, rightly, credited for the invention of the ombudsman institution.35 The ombudsman 
in the classical Swedish sense could be defined as a statutory entity outside the normal structure 
of the state, independent in its work, fulfilling its task under the relevant national and international 
laws, mainly on complaints from the ordinary inhabitant.36 By ‘outside the normal structure of the 
state’ is meant that the institution does not operate within the executive, the legislative or the 
judicial branches.37 The original role of this institution was somewhat unrelated to human rights. A 
former Ombudsman in Sweden has noted that38  
 
This first Ombudsman, this Ombudsman of 1809, did not focus very much on issues that are today 
called human rights. Nor was he engaged in prevention… He was – and still is – a maladministration 
Ombudsman. 
 
2.1.2 NHRIs before Paris 
Whereas the original ombudsman was a product of national experience, NHRIs in their prevailing 
fashion are the brainchild of the international community. International appetite for institutions at 
national level for the promotion and protection of human rights could be as old as the UN human 
rights system itself. One of the earliest concerns of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
appears to have been the quest for partners at the national level to assist in the promotional 
mandate assigned to the then nascent UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).39 At its 
second session, ECOSOC earnestly invited Members of the UN to40 
 
Consider the desirability of establishing information groups  or local human rights committees  within 
their respective countries to collaborate with them in furthering the work of the Commission on 
Human Rights. 
                                                 
35  See for instance, F Orton ‘Evolution and perspectives of the institution of the Ombudsman’ LA Sicilianos (ed) 
The prevention of human rights violations (2001) 226. 
36  Orton (n 35 above) 227. 
37  As above. 
38  Orton (n 35 above) 226.  
39  Resolution 9(II) adopted 21 June 1946 (documents E/56/Rev. 1 and document E/84, para 4). 
40  As above. Emphasis added. 
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Evidently, ECOSOC was less ambitious. All it bargained for were institutions at national level to 
collaborate with Members States and the UNCHR in the erstwhile less defined promotional 
mandate. It would seem the UN advocated for much less complicated institutions as evidenced by 
the terminology assigned to the envisaged bodies. Indeed, such terms as ‘information groups’ or 
‘human rights committees’ represent very simple entities devoid of sophistications. However, 
ambiguity remained as to the designation and function of such institutions.41  
 
Fourteen years later, ECOSOC, appreciating the crucial role such bodies could play in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, invited Member States of the UN to favour the formation 
and continuation of such bodies as well as to communicate all the relevant information on the 
subject to the Secretary General.42    
 
These efforts had been heightened, as early as 1955, when the UN created the Programme 
of Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights (Programme of 
Advisory Services) to effectively promote the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs.43 This 
initiative was reinforced in 1987, when, then UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar 
established the Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance in the Field of 
Human Rights,44 renamed Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights 
(Voluntary Fund).45 The Voluntary Fund was set up to establish and offer technical support to 
national and regional institutions aimed at implementing international standards of human rights at 
the national level.46 
  
On 16 December 1977, the General Assembly suggested that a special seminar within the 
Programme of Advisory Services should be organised at a universal level to discuss NHRIs.47 
Obviously, a meeting of this kind would seek to seal the void then existing regarding the structure 
and function of NHRIs.48 This ambition was fulfilled in September 1978, when the UNCHR 
organised a seminar to ‘draft guidelines for the structure and functioning of national institutions.’49  
 
                                                 
41  Decaux (n 31 above) 233. 
42  ECOSOC resolution 772 B (XXX) of 25 July 1960. 
43  The Programme of Advisory Services was established by dint of resolution 926 (X) of 14 December 1955.  
44  The Voluntary Fund was established pursuant to ECOSOC decision 1987/147 of 29 May 1987. 
45  The Fund was renamed by dint of UNCHR resolution 1991/49 of 5 March 1991.  
46  Tsekos (n 11 above) 21. 
47  This desire was expressed through resolution 32/123 of 16 December 1977. 
48  The General Assembly by the same instrument recommended, as measures for the celebration of the thirtieth 
anniversary of the UDHR, the establishment of national or local institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, and the encouragement of teaching of programmes on human rights at the various levels of education.  
49  The UNCHR decided to take up the task of organizing the seminar through resolution 23 (XXXIV) of 8 March 
1978. See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1978, Supplement No. 4 (E/1978/34), chap. XXVI, sect. 
A. 
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The Seminar on National and Local Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, held in Geneva from 18 to 29 September 1978,50 recommended that NHRIs perform at 
least five functions. It was agreed that NHRIs should act as sources of human rights information for 
governments and the citizenry, and in this connection assist in educating public opinion and 
promoting public awareness and respect for human rights. NHRIs would further consider and make 
recommendations regarding any particular state of affairs referred to them by their host 
governments as well as offer advice on any questions regarding human rights. At the same forum, 
NHRIs were also assigned the role of studying and keeping under review the status of legislation, 
judicial decisions and administrative arrangements for the promotion of human rights, and to 
prepare reports on these matters to appropriate authorities. It was the outcome of this international 
gathering that the mandate of NHRIs should be flexible enough to allow the performance of any 
other role which governments may assign them in connection to international agreements to which 
they are a party. 
  
Three critical items were stated as regards the structure of NHRIs. Firstly, it was decided 
that NHRIs should be so designed as to reflect, in their composition, wide cross-sections of the 
nation, thereby bringing all shades of the population in the decision making process in regard to 
human rights. Secondly, the seminar expressed that NHRIs need to function regularly, and that 
access to them should be available to any member of the public or any public authority. The 
seminar went further to suggest that in appropriate cases, NHRIs ought to have local or regional 
advisory organs to assist them in discharging their functions. These guidelines were endorsed by 
the UNCHR51 and, subsequently, the General Assembly in the same year.52 
 
Thereafter, repeatedly, the UN has called upon Member States to put in place a sound 
infrastructure at national level for the promotion and protection of human rights. During such 
deliberations, the UNCHR has invariably been asked to assist Member States technically or even 
financially in their endeavour to establish NHRIs. Critical General Assembly initiatives in this regard 
include: resolution 44/64 of 8 December 1989; resolution 1990/73 of 7 March 1990; resolution 
1991/27 of 5 March 1991; resolution 46/124 of 17 December 1991; and resolution 1992/54 of 3 
March 1992.  
 
These initiatives have not been in vain. Undeniably, during the early 1990s, a burgeoning 
interest emerged worldwide in the creation, support and strengthening of NHRIs.53 These interests 
found expression, for instance, during the Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on 
                                                 
50  See, ST/HR/SER.A/2 and Add 1. 
51  See, ST/HR/SER.A/2 and Add 1. 
52  The guidelines were endorsed through resolution 33/46 of 14 December 1978. 
53  Pohjolainen (n 32 above) 2. 
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Human Rights;54 the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World 
Conference on Human Rights Institutions;55 and the Workshop for the Asia-Pacific Region on 
Human Rights Issues.56   
 
2.1.3 The Paris Conference 
The most momentous of the undertakings on the rubric under review, however, remains the 
International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
held in Paris from 7 to 9 October 1991.57 The findings of this workshop were endorsed by the 
UNCHR58 and later by the General Assembly as Principles Relating to the Status of National 
Institutions.59 
  
The Paris Principles ‘represent a refinement and extension of the guidelines developed in 
1978’60 and are ‘considered to be the minimum standards for the establishment and operation of 
domestic human rights institutions.’61 Hitherto, Paris Principles constitute the most elaborate and 
widely acknowledged efforts to define and structure NHRIs. Of the normative status of Paris 
Principles, it has been stated:62 
 
The Principles have gained considerable political and moral weight due to the fact that various 
international and national organisations have welcomed these principles and encouraged 
governments to follow them. 
 
In fact, one could safely deduce that they represent a fundamental watershed for these bastions of 
human entitlements. These principles while are not intended for wholesale application are 
envisioned to guide the process of installing NHRIs where they are not and also strengthening 
already existing ones. They provide a very general framework for the structure, mandate and 
powers of NHRIs.63 
 
According to these principles, NHRIs are required to be vested with the competence to 
promote and protect human rights. The principles prescribe that NHRIs ought to be given as broad 
a mandate as possible, which should be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text. Even 
a cursory glance at Paris Principles accentuates that the stipulated roles for NHRIs are capable of 
                                                 
54  Held at Tunis from 2 to 6 November 1992. 
55  Held at Ottawa from 30 September to 2 October 1992. 
56  Held at Jakarta from 26 to 28 January 1993. 
57  See, E/CN.4/1992/43 and Add. 1 and 2. 
58  Adopted through resolution 1992/54 of the 3 of March 1992. 
59  n 17 above. 
60  ECOSOC, E/CN.4/2005/107 of 19 January 2005. 
61  CJ Peterson ‘The Paris principles and human rights institutions: Is Hong Kong slipping further away from the 
mark?’ (2003) Hong Kong Law Journal 514.    
62  Pohjolainen (n 32 above) 9. 
63  Pohjolainen (n 32 above) 14. 
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a dual nomenclature: As actors on the international front and as players on the national scene.  In 
appreciation of this development, it has aptly been pointed out of the emerging ombudsman:64  
 
Originally, it was a very national institution with a very national focus. Today that is no longer so; 
international contacts are common and a number of international bodies exist… in both of which 
ombudsmen participate, and so forth.  
 
This ‘dual mandate’ has occurred over time. As stated above, the original idea that ECOSOC had 
was that NHRIs would act as liaison points for both international and national human rights actors.  
At least two roles naturally followed from this design. Firstly, it was initially acknowledged that 
NHRIs would constitute some form of ‘human rights information centers.’ As information centres, 
the UN would be able to utilize these outfits as hinter libraries and hence use them for the 
dissemination of human rights materials most likely generated at the international level.65  NHRIs 
would also utilize their proximity to national authorities and populations to publicize the activities of 
the UN as well as bring to the attention of their national governments and inhabitants the 
developments at the international level pertaining to human rights. Thus, NHRIs would bring to the 
attention of governments the latest treaties enacted, the latest human rights bodies on the scene 
and other related human rights developments.    
 
That thinking has since changed. Rather, it has been built on. Since the enactment of the 
Paris Principles, NHRIs are seen in more light. More than just acting as liaison points for the UN, 
NHRIs are increasingly becoming significant players, on both the international and national fronts. 
Their dual mandate was reaffirmed at Paris when they were designated to: 
 
Cooperate with the United Nations and any other organization in the United Nations system, the 
regional institutions and the national institutions of other countries that are competent in the areas of 
the promotion and protection of human rights… 
 
In practice, this mandate has been widely interpreted. At the international level, NHRIs are now 
expected to (and they often do) participate in the writing of and negotiation of international human 
rights treaties and other instruments. They are now critical components of the international 
community. It is not far fetched to say that hardly any international conference or seminar takes 
place without the involvement of members of these institutions. This has not been accidental. The 
international community expects NHRIs to be interactive, to attend international forums, share 
expertise and experiences as well as offer their manpower in the making and development of 
human rights jurisprudence. It is very much within their mandate to take part in the implementation 
and monitoring of international human rights law. The Paris Principles desire that NHRIs will play a 
role in the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the international 
human rights instruments to which their host states are a party. It is required, for example, that 
                                                 
64  Orton (n 35 above) 229. 
65  This role was still envisaged in resolution A/Res/46/124 of 17 December 1991. 
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NHRIs write shadow reports as well as attend and make presentations at the sessions of treaty 
monitoring bodies. The Paris Principles particularly stipulate that one role of NHRIs should be: 
 
To contribute to the reports which states are required to submit to United Nations bodies and 
committees, and to regional institutions, pursuant to their treaty obligations and, where necessary, to 
express an opinion on the subject, with due respect for their independence… 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) has honoured this 
clause by granting all NHRIs of African states observer status so long as they satisfy certain 
enumerated criterion.66 This status allows NHRIs to participate in the submission of reports 
pertaining to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).67 Even the 
rather formal international human rights tribunals such as the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Court) and the European Court on Human Rights are equally not out of 
the bounds of NHRIs. The very nature of NHRIs sanctions the institution of proceedings of human 
rights import before these international tribunals, and they have been doing it ever since. NHRIs 
are also expected to support other organizations, mostly NGOs, initiating claims before 
international tribunals, for instance, through legal advice or material support. 
 
At the national level, NHRIs are performers of many trades. Generally speaking, their role 
in this regard is to strengthen the protection of human rights.68 This broad mandate is amenable to 
threefold taxonomy; (a) promotion, (b) enforcement, and (c) investigation of individual complaints. 
 
As regards promotion, the Paris Principles require NHRIs to assist in the formulation of 
programmes for the teaching of, and research into, human rights and take part in their execution in 
schools, universities and professional circles. Alongside this function, Paris Principles envisage a 
role for NHRIs in the publicization of human rights and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination 
by increasing public awareness especially through information and education using available press 
organs. They are expected to sensitize people as well as bring to their attention the concept of 
human rights. The international community is, in fact, opportunistic that public education on human 
rights done by a national institution is bound to have far greater impact because local bodies will 
usually have the ability to package human rights items in a manner that is comprehensible by the 
local populations even defeating the cultural relativism barrier.69 This task necessitates that NHRIs 
open up branches all over the country to ensure quick access as well as prompt dissemination of 
human rights knowledge.  
 
                                                 
66  During its 24 th Ordinary Session, held from 22 to 31 October 1998, in Banjul, the African Commission granted 
observer status to NHRIs in return for mutual cooperation in the protection and promotional mandate. 
67  Adopted on 27 June 1981 by the 18 th Assembly of Heads of State of the Organisation of African Unity at 
Nairobi. Entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
68  S Spencer ‘A human rights commission for the United Kingdom – Some options’ (1997) European Human 
Rights Law Review 153.  
69  Tsekos (n 11 above) 22. 
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Regarding enforcement, policy formulation is one area where active involvement of NHRIs 
is envisaged. It is projected that NHRIs will have an opportunity to inform the processes that lead 
to government policy. They are required to advice governments especially where policies that are 
likely to impact on human rights are concerned. This kind of advice is also required for parliament 
to enable it perform its roles. As if taking cue from this standard, a piece of academic work has 
prescribed the following role for the proposed NHRI in the UK, if established:70 
 
A key role of the Commission would be to give advice to Parliament, to public and private bodies and 
to the public at large. Its advice to Parliament would enable MPs and Peers to question more 
effectively the extent to which legislative proposals conform to… the United Kingdom’s … 
international obligations…  
 
The Paris Principles assign another role to NHRIs: To encourage ratification of international 
instruments or accession to those instruments, and to ensure their implementation. Even after 
ratification, NHRIs may be instrumental in the domestication process. It is trite knowledge that most 
Commonwealth states adopt a dualist position requiring that a separate municipal act give their 
international obligations domestic effect.71 Domestication of international obligations is, therefore, a 
vital component of human rights enforcement and it is ideal that this role has been ascribed to 
these bodies. The actual legislation process is equally not beyond NHRIs. According to Paris 
Principles, the prerogative of NHRIs extends to: ‘Any legislative or administrative provisions, as 
well as provisions relating to judicial organizations.’ Suffice to state, it is considered good practice 
for NHRIs to breathe human rights life into all proposed laws and measures within their 
jurisdictions.  
 
Paris Principles further envisage that, as an optional measure, NHRIs may be authorized to 
hear and consider complaints and petitions concerning individual situations. In this regard, petitions 
may be brought before NHRIs and it is advised that where such disputes are lodged, an amicable 
settlement should be sought through conciliation or, within the limits prescribed by the law, through 
binding decisions.  It is important to note that NHRIs are in practice hardly afforded the right to give 
binding judicial decisions. Thus, in some jurisdictions, the decisions of these tribunals will usually 
require the endorsement of a proper judicial tribunal before they could come into force.72  
 
NHRIs, however, have come to be known for their role in investigating human rights 
violations especially by state authorities. In this regard, a scholarly contribution has noted that 
‘stronger emphasis has, for instance, been placed on the importance of the investigative and 
complaints-handling function, which is now recognized as one of the core functions of national 
                                                 
70  Spencer (n 68 above) 157, 158. 
71  See, I Brownlie Principles of public international law (1973) 33. 
72  For instance, according to sec 19(4) of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act, 2002, orders 
issued under the Act must be filed with the High Court. 
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institutions.’73 This mandate is usually accompanied with the power to summon persons, power to 
summon witnesses, to compel attendance of suspects and to issue a report.  
 
The Paris Conference also delved to prescribe the nature and composition of NHRIs. The 
principles require that the institutions be given a broad mandate to enforce human rights and enjoy 
absolute independence from governments. Independence here is guaranteed by the provision of 
adequate funding and the ability to higher own staff and premises. The mandates of especially the 
senior staff are required to be specifically stipulated in an official act to ensure their autonomy in 
the performance of their functions. The institutions should also have pluralistic membership and 
represent organizations in civil society that are actively involved in the protection and promotion of 
human rights. Equally important, the institutions should be accountable, transparent, and 
accessible to the public.74  
 
Even as the Paris Principles continue to garner international recognition and acceptance, 
criticisms have not been in abeyance. A commentator has, for example, succumbed that:75 
 
It is true that these principles reflect more the concept of national human rights commissions than 
that of national human rights ombudsmen. The simple explanation is that the host in Paris was a 
commission and that the main drafter of these principles was a commissioner (the then Federal 
Human Rights Commissioner of Australia, … Ms Mary Robinson).  
 
2.1.4 After Paris 
Another landmark in the history of the NHRIs is the World Conference on Human Rights’76 Vienna 
Declaration, which reaffirmed: 
 
The important and constructive role played by national institutions for the promotion and protection of 
Human Rights, in particular their advisory role to the competent authorities, their role at remedying 
human rights violations, in the dissemination of information and education in human rights. 
 
The Vienna Declaration was significant in more ways than one. It was at Vienna that the double 
nature of NHRIs became fully apparent. Indeed, it was at this forum that NHRIs were first granted 
the right to participate in international debates.77 NHRIs were effectively represented at this forum, 
                                                 
73  Pohjolainen (n 32 above) 8. 
74  Peterson (n 61 above) 514. 
75  Orton (n 35 above) 229. 
76  World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 – 25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) at 20 
(1993). 
77  ECOSOC, E/CN.4/2005/107 of 19 January 2005. 
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an affirmation of their international mandate. The dual mandate exhibited in Vienna was later 
acclaimed in the following terms: 78 
 
National institutions thus have a double legitimacy. On the one hand, their own legitimacy which 
each institution derives from it own domestic legal basis – and hence the ‘coordination’ of national 
institutions outside any preestablished framework – and, on the other hand, a new international 
legitimacy conferred – often with some misunderstandings – by the United Nations system itself, or 
by a regional system such as the OAU, the OSCE or the Council of Europe.   
 
For the umpteenth time, the Vienna Declaration encouraged the establishment and strengthening 
of NHRIs together with recognising that it is the right of each state to choose the framework, which 
is best, suited to its particular needs at the national level. Vienna Declaration granted formal status 
to the International Committee for the Coordination of National Institutions as a statutory liaison 
instrument of the UN human rights system.  One of the principle functions of this outfit is the 
organisation of a biannual world meeting of NHRIs. Interestingly, Vienna Declaration sees NHRIs 
as best suited to play a critical role in eliminating xenophobia:79 
 
Between 5 and 7 February 1996, under the auspices of the UNCHR, and the Cameroon 
National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms, participants at the First African Conference 
of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights met in Yaoundé, 
Cameroon, and proclaimed the Yaoundé Declaration. The Conference reaffirmed the ‘important 
role that National Institutions must play both with regard to their responsibilities vis-à-vis 
government and their responsibility to promote human rights and provide remedy when those 
rights are violated.’ It ventured to create a Coordinating Committee of African National Institutions, 
which would work, in close collaboration with the International Coordinating Committee and the 
UNCHR. 
 
Yaoundé Declaration called for regular consultation and exchange of information between 
all NHRIs particularly those within the African region, as well as the development of a common 
programme of activities. The declaration endorsed the ‘creation of new National Institutions to 





                                                 
78  Decaux (n 31 above) 234. 
79  Decaux (n 31 above) 235. 
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2.2 In lieu of conclusion 
 
The thirst for NHRIs has not been the preserve of the UN. The Commonwealth has also had its fair 
share of contribution. Part of its most profound endeavours is the Human Rights Institutions Best 
Practice Principles,80 which serve as guidelines for Commonwealth states. Moreover, between 22 
and 26 March 2004, representatives of NHRIs and parliaments from ten Commonwealth countries 
gathered in Abuja, Nigeria, to explore ways in which NHRIs and parliaments could cooperate for 
the better enforcement of human rights. The workshop gave rise to the Abuja Guidelines on the 
Relationship between Parliaments, Parliamentarians and Commonwealth National Human Rights 
Institutions (Abuja Guidelines).  
 
As if to complement the efforts initiated by the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
(as it then was) enacted the African Charter, which treaty became the first to codify the concept of 
NHRIs. At article 26, the treaty implores Member States to allow for ‘the establishment and 
improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed’ therein.  
 
In 1996, the African Commission, at the platform of the Mauritius Plan of Action,81 
championed for the holding of workshops to promote awareness and enhancement of NHRIs and 
called for the cooperation of NHRIs in the fulfilment of its mandate of promoting and protecting 
human and peoples’ rights. It further undertook to encourage the establishment of NHRIs. These 
institutions, it was envisioned, could serve as a basis for initiative for human rights in the respective 
countries as well as help to disseminate the African Charter and to fulfil its educational mission. 
The African Commission was upbeat that these bodies may also contribute to protective activities 
by availing it information on human rights violations and by assisting the victims of such violations. 
 
Come 1998, the African Commission was at it again. During its 24th Ordinary Session it 
commended ‘the increasing interest shown by African states in establishing and strengthening 
national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights based on the principles of 
independence and pluralism.’  It further recognised,  
 
The right of each state to establish, according to its sovereign prerogatives and within the most 
appropriate legislative framework, a national institution charged with the promotion and protection of 
human rights according to internationally recognised norms.   
 
                                                 
80  Commonwealth Secretariat (2001). 
81  Reprinted in 6 Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1996-97) 215. 
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It is here that the African Commission conceded observer status to African NHRIs as beseeched 
by the Yaoundé Declaration.  
 
In lieu of conclusion, it is noted that there are many other sporadic initiatives that have paid 
tribute to the concept of NHRIs. It would appear the quest for NHRIs has converted into an 
unstoppable train and there is no gainsaying the fact that these bodies are now fundamental 
players on both the international and national planes. The tragedy, however, remains that the 
structure and roles assigned to NHRIs  resemble or appear contradict more conventional state 
organs. One may also argue that these institutions, mostly fronted by the international community, 

































The rule of law, separation of powers and the advent of NHRIs: An 
anatomy of a discord? 
 
To that end they vested the structure of our central government in the system of checks and 
balances. For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt 
necessity… These long-headed statesmen had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or 




The introductory chapter underscored that the current investigation intends to find an 
unproblematic pride of place for NHRIs in Commonwealth Africa.83 This chapter revisits two key 
and common attributes of these Commonwealth constitutions - the concept of the rule of law and 
the doctrine of separation of powers. The analysis is intended to highlight certain aspects that 
arguably may pose challenges to the wellbeing of NHRIs in the tripartite government configuration 
and, consequently, the protection of human rights. It would be idle to pretend to give a detailed 
account of Commonwealth constitutions in Africa, much less a comprehensive review of any 
selected constitutional items. Hence, a selective approach is preferred.  
 
It is believed that the clearest appreciation of Commonwealth constitutions in Africa is only 
possible if the origin of this tradition is first explored. Indeed, it is acclaimed philosophically that a 
historical perspective is usually a catalyst for quick and proper understanding of any given 
subject.84 Thus, this study traces Commonwealth constitutions in Africa to their cradle - the 
Westminster constitutional model, the ideal to which the latter counterparts have invariably aspired.  
 
The link between Commonwealth constitutions and the Westminster constitutional model is 
not difficult to pinpoint. De Smith, for example, documented the typical mechanism for the 
attainment of independence by the former British colonies.85 This procedure included many items 
and notably ‘an independence Order, to which the independence constitution will be scheduled…’86 
Such an Order would usually be made by Her Majesty in Council under existing statutory or 
                                                 
82  Frankfurter (n 5 above).  
83  Commonwealth denotes two things. First, an association of independent member states; and second, territories 
which are in various ways dependent on those independent members. (See de Smith (n 20 above) 627, 628 & 629). The 
list of Commonwealth states in Africa could be exhausted – they include: Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, The Gambia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
84  In Politics, it is stated: ‘He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything 
else, will obtain the clearest view of them’. Kaplan (n 26 above) 279. 
85  de Smith (n 20 above) 635. 
86  As above. 
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prerogative powers in the United Kingdom.87  As if to supply ‘practice’ to this theory, Nwabueze 
described the independence process in the instance of Nigeria succinctly thus:88 
 
This final culmination was brought about in Nigeria by an act enacted by the British parliament in 
1960 and entitled ‘An Act to make provision for, and in connection with, the attainment by Nigeria of 
fully responsible status within the Commonwealth’, the short title of which is the Nigerian 
Independence Act. The legal status and name of the country were changed from ‘the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria’ to ‘Nigeria’ and the dependence of Nigeria upon Britain was formally 
terminated … 
 
Against this backdrop, the affiliation of Commonwealth legal systems to the Westminster cannot be 
clearer. 
 
To achieve the ends of this chapter, the attributes mentioned above will be discussed, each 
in turn. For each aspect, three distinct ingredients are discernible albeit presented simultaneously: 
A philosophical account; a revisit of the attribute in question in its most natural and original setting - 
the Westminster constitutional model - and the attribute in the light of the development of NHRIs.  
 
3.1 The rule of law: The concept in the imminence of NHRIs  
 
Intellectual ownership of the ‘concept of the rule of law’ would be difficult to claim. This is because 
the:89 
 
Rule of law in some form may be traced back to Aristotle and has been championed by Roman 
jurists; medieval natural law thinkers; Enlightenment philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Montesquieu and the American founders; German philosophers Kant, Hegel and the 
nineteenth century advocates of the rechtsstaat; and in this century such ideologically diverse figures 
as Hayek, Rawis, Scalia, Jiang Zemin and Lee Kuan Yew. 
 
The concept in its Westminster formulation is, however, often attributed to AV Dicey.90 Dicey 
spared constructive intellectual moments to study the English Constitution and noticed that it had 
the ‘rule of law’ as a central feature.91 The rule of law, he argued, was one expression with at least 
three though kindred conceptions. In the first place, the concept entails that no man can be lawfully 
made to suffer in body or in goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary 
legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense, he argued that the rule of law is 
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, 
                                                 
87  As above. 
88  BO Nwabueze A constitutional history of Nigeria (1982) 60. 
89  R Peerenboom ‘Human rights and rule of law: What’s the relationship?’ (2005) Spring Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 810.  
90  See ECS Wade & AW Bradley Constitutional law (1970) 63, where it is stated: ‘Of all writers on the constitution 
since Blackstone the most influential has been the late A.V. Dicey…’ 
91  Generally, Dicey (n 23 above). 
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arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.92 This postulation was not entirely an innovation. 
The Magna Carter had recognized much earlier that:93 
 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or 
exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or 
send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land.  
 
In the second sense, the concept entails not only that no man is above the law, but also that every 
man, whatever be his/her rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and 
amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals. Dicey underscored the need for judicial 
processes being effected in ordinary tribunals hence elevating the role of the judicial branch of 
state. Again, this idea was not novel. Locke already held that ‘no man in the civil society can be 
exempted from the laws of it.’94 
 
The term ‘rule of law’ has a third conception. That:95 
  
The constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general principles of the 
constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us the 
result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before 
the courts; whereas under many foreign constitutions the security (such as it is) given to the rights of 
individuals results, or appears to result, from the general principles of the constitution. 
  
Dicey praised the rule of law, exemplified by the English Constitution, as a sound concept and 
ordained it the distinguishing character of English constitutionalism. Of this characteristic, he 
boasted:96 
 
Foreign observers of English manners, such for example as Voltaire, De Lolme, de Tocqueville, or 
Gneist, have been far more struck than have Englishmen themselves with the fact that England is a 
country governed, as is scarcely any other part of Europe, under the rule of law…   
 
However, it has not been easy to decipher the exact meaning of the rule of law as propagated by 
Dicey and neither has his idea been unanimously accepted. Writing in 1933, Jennings stated that 
the exposition given by Dicey of the concept creates a false impression.97 Commenting decades 
later, de Smith described the concept as ‘one of open texture’ which ‘lends itself to an extremely 
wide range of interpretations.’98 He did not, nonetheless, fail to attempt an interpretation of the 
concept. Writes de Smith:99 
                                                 
92  Dicey (n 23 above). 
93  ‘Magna Carter’ ch 39 in H Marsh British documents of liberty (1971) 44 – 47.    
94  J Locke Of civil government (1948) (1689) 57. 
95  Dicey (n 23 above) 196. 
96  Dicey (n 23 above) 184. 
97  WI Jennings The law and the constitution (1933) 44. 
98  de Smith (n 20 above) 40. 
99  As above. 
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One can at least say that the concept is usually intended to imply (i) that the powers exercised by 
politicians and officials must have a legitimate foundation; they must be based on authority conferred 
by law; and (ii) that the law should conform to certain minimum standards of justice, both substantive 
and procedural.   
 
Understood in this light, the law governs and its jurisdiction is uncontested. This position remains 
true of the UK more than a century since Dicey’s study. As recent as 1989, Verkuil affirmed that 
‘the rule of law is at the heart of the English constitutionalism that forms the backdrop of our own 
constitutional experience.’100  
 
If it is agreed that an accurate meaning of the rule of law has been supplied, then, it is not 
difficult to identify its traces in modern constitutions of Commonwealth Africa. According to 
Jennings, the existence of a written constitution is, in itself, evidence of the rule of law. It is his view 
that the object of the constitution ‘is definitely to establish the rule of law.’101 Thus, each ‘action of a 
public authority can be tested by the Constitution, or by the laws made in accordance with the 
Constitution, to determine whether it was legal or illegal.’102 He further argues that the law 
regulates political action far more closely where there is a written constitution prescribing more 
fundamental functions of government than where there is a supreme legislature as in the UK.103  
 
Unlike the UK, most (all) states in Commonwealth Africa have at a given epoch ventured to 
enact a written constitution.  A remarkable feature of these constitutions is that they declare 
themselves sovereign over and above other laws, actions, authorities, precedents, customs or 
conventions. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is remarkable in this regard. Its 
place in the social and political dispensation is clear: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.’104 A similar stipulation exists in the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana105 and the 
Constitution of Kenya.106 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt is a notable departure 
from the monologue of supreme constitutions. It recognizes the pillars of Islam law as the principle 
source of legislation.107  Nonetheless, it reckons the uncontested supremacy of the law.108  
 
Looked at from Jennings’ point of view, this development of supreme written constitutions is 
fundamental proof of the resolve to uphold the rule of law, even if in principle only. Invariably, also, 
modern constitutions stipulate that no person may be punished or made to suffer except through a 
                                                 
100   PR Verkuil ‘Separation of powers, the rule of law and the idea of independence’ (1989) Winter William and Mary 
Law Review 305.   
101  Jennings (n 97 above) 41. 
102  As above. 
103  Jennings (n 97 above) 51. 
104  Sec 2. 
105  Art 1(2). 
106  Sec 3. 
107  Art 2. 
108  Art 65. 
 23 
legal sentence entered by a competent and ordinary tribunal after a due process of law. The 
constitutions of Ghana,109 Kenya,110 South Africa,111 Uganda112 and many others have adopted this 
approach, in honour of Dicey’s theory. One may add that the doctrine of judicial precedent and the 
entrenchment of bill of rights within Commonwealth constitutions is now settled custom, bringing to 
passage Dicey’s ‘triple limbed’ theory. 
 
It is a domestic set up akin to the one described above that is intended to play host to 
NHRIs, conceptualized at the international level. Arguably, the emergence of these human rights 
bodies in national constitutional systems breeds two contrasting offshoots. One view holds that the 
advent of NHRIs is a fundamental step towards a culture of the rule of law.  In this regard, NHRIs 
are seen as vital ingredients in transitional processes especially in states recuperating from civil 
war or other political calamities. Reif observes that:113 
 
Given the severe human rights problems in war-torn societies, national human rights protection role 
will probably continue to be most relevant for potential inclusion in future peace agreements or as 
elements of civil reconstruction. 
 
For the same reason, this dosage is also prescribed for emerging democracies and there is 
already sufficient practice in this connection.114 In line with this, it has been suggested that NHRIs 
should be supplemented with a specific requirement of fundamental democratic processes, 
including free elections, the rule of law and an independent judiciary.115 This school of thought 
argues that NHRIs are able to uphold the rule of law in a number of ways. For instance, by 
instituting proceedings before the ordinary courts of law, these fortresses of human rights assert 
the supremacy of the law. In the pursuit of this end, NHRIs still have the eye of international 
tribunals especially where domestic remedies are inadequate or inexistent.116 Moreover, in some 
cases, NHRIs are given the powers to seek the enforcement of (human rights) law by persuading 
or even exerting pressure on the executive and legislative branches of state. The budding bodies 
may also advance the rule of law by investigating violations of human rights norms and ensuring 
reparations to those who suffer such violations. 
 
Painted differently, these same arguments may constitute a conflicting facet. Firstly, the 
Paris Principles do not eliminate the possibility of NHRIs themselves constituting tribunals that may 
adjudicate disputes pertaining to human rights. Certain states such as Kenya117 and Uganda 118 
                                                 
109  See, art 19. 
110  See, sec 77. 
111  See, sec 35.  
112  Art 28. 
113  Reif (n 33 above) 16.  
114  As above. 
115  Pohjolainen (n 32 above) 8. 
116  Since the Interhandel case ((1959) ICJ Reports), it is now established principle that international tribunals can 
only be seized after local remedies are exhausted or where they are inadequate or unavailable. 
117  Sec 19 of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act, 2002 (Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 22 
(Acts No. 1)) gives the NHRI powers of a court. 
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have already enacted NHRIs granting them judicial or quasi judicial authority. This makes it accent 
that the erstwhile formulation requiring judicial adjudication only before ordinary tribunals is already 
defeated.119 Furthermore, the current trend is in favour of adjudicating human rights violations in 
international tribunals especially where there are inadequate local remedies. This seems to 
suggest that the ordinary judicial processes may largely be in abeyance, as regards human rights 
protection, as long as alternative enforcement forums abound. Nonetheless, NHRIs tribunals 
mostly lack the power to give binding decisions and their orders will usually require the magic of 
judicial endorsement to acquire the force of law.120 This could still imply the prominence of ordinary 
domestic courts in the protection of the rule of law, even though tremendously shaken. 
 
Secondly, when Dicey referred to ‘ordinary law’, he had in mind the common law or law 
enacted in acts of parliament.121 The development of NHRIs has occurred concurrently with the 
tendency of norm setting of matters human rights at the international level. Human rights law is, 
therefore, increasingly becoming a domain of international law, and national jurisdictions have, 
invariably, only aspired to these international standards. The enactment of law solely at the 
national level through ordinary legislative processes is, therefore, no longer the case, and it may be 
time to reconsider Dicey’s postulations. True, human rights are no longer sourced solely from 
judicial precedents or national constitutions. The situation is less helped in monist states where 
norms enacted at the international plane immediately sanction domestic force without even 
requiring any further deliberative processes.122 In the case of norms that have coalesced into 
customary international law such as torture, these may assume the force of law without even tacit 
or express involvement of national structures, further urging Dicey’s postulations into an abyss.  
 
It might help to recall that the Diceyian idea frowns upon the exercise by any organ of state 
of wide or arbitrary or discretionary powers. This position does not augur well for the Paris 
Principles, which procure as wide a mandate as possible for NHRIs. Even though these powers 
are required to be precisely defined in a constitutional or legislative text, it is not far fetched to hold 
that the emergence of NHRIs is bound to stifle already established order. Suffice to state, the 
advent of NHRIs could offer new challenges to the rule of law as erstwhile formulated.   
 
Yet the Diceyian doctrine is not ‘good for nothing’. It serves numerous ends. Preambular 
paragraph 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),123 for instance, reckoned that it 
is essential that ‘human rights should be protected by the rule of law.’ In this way the rule of law 
                                                                                                                                                                  
118  The Uganda Human Rights Commission has already handed down crucial decisions against government 
officials. See, for instance, Kizza Charles and Hon Miria Matembe UHRC 655/2000.  
119  This is not to say that disputes have always been decided before ordinary courts. Commonwealth jurisdictions 
are known to also establish specialized courts to deal with, say, labour disputes or court martial matters. 
120  Sec 19(4) of the Act requires that orders issued by the NHRI must be filed with the High Court. 
121  Wade & Bradley (n 90 above) 66. 
122  See, I Brownlie Principles of public international law (1973) 33. 
123  Adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 
1948.  
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has come to be identified with the concept of the rights of man.124 During a forum organized by the 
International Commission of Jurists in Delhi in 1959, representatives of no fewer than fifty three 
countries affirmed their recognition that the rule of law is a dynamic concept which should be 
employed to safeguard and advance the political and civil rights of the individual in a free society. It 
has been advanced that the observance of the rule of law is critical to progress in both the under-
developed and developed worlds.125 In this regard, the rule of law is said to be the key that can 
unlock greater economic and ethical wealth.126 A former President of the World Bank has even 
advised that for Africa to develop, ‘it needs strong, well established rule of law regimes to enable it 
to trade itself into prosperity and out of poverty.’127   
 
3.2 Separation of powers  
 
3.2.1 The doctrine and the doctorations 
De Smith recounted the history and epochs of the doctrine of separation of powers in the most 
dramatic format. The doctrine, he records,128 
 
… is traceable back to Aristotle; it was developed by Locke; its best known formulation, by the 
French political philosopher Montesquieu, was based on an analysis of the English constitution of 
the early eighteenth century, but an idealized rather than a real English constitution; the disciples of 
Montesquieu, particularly numerous in the North American colonies, added their own refinements 
and today the doctrine survives in a number of curious manifestations.  
 
Aristotle alluded to, perhaps, one of the earliest and most influential statements in political and 
legal thought. He conceived that ‘power tends to corrupt’ and that ‘absolute power tends to corrupt 
absolutely.’129 
 
 In 1690, Locke130 warned against the concentration of state powers in a few individuals. He 
pointed out that where state power is entrusted with a few persons, the liberty of citizens often 
rests in imminent danger. The panacea he supplied to this vexing state of affairs is the distribution 
of power to different individuals. Locke posited three powers, a legislative, an executive and a 
federative.131 By ‘federative’, he meant the power to conduct foreign affairs.132 The philosopher did 
not envisage an independent judiciary and neither did he believe in ‘independence and equality’ as 
fundamental attributes of separation of powers; for he is on record as having held: ‘There can be 
                                                 
124  Wade & Bradley (n 90 above) 63. 
125  Rt. Hon. Lord Woolf of Barnes ‘The Judiciary of England and Wales and the rule of law’ (2006) Indiana Law 
Review 616. 
126  As above. 
127  JD Wolfensohn, President, World Bank Group, Empowerment, Security and Opportunity through Law and 
Justice, Address in St. Petersburg, Russia (9 July 2001). 
128  de Smith (n 20 above) 40, 41. 
129  n 26 above. 
130  Locke (n 7 above). 
131  Sarvis (n 4 above) 319. 
132  As above. 
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but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be 
subordinate.’133  
 
The doctrine of separation of powers is, however, often ascribed to the French jurist, 
Montesquieu.134 Montesquieu assessed the Constitution of the UK and deduced that it had a 
discernable Executive, a Legislature, and a Judiciary.  This tripartite division of functions, he 
argued, was a common feature of governments. His sentiments, in this regard, have attained 
sanctity:135 
 
In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect of things 
dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on civil law. By 
virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or 
abrogates those that have already been enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or 
receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he 
punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call 
the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.   
 
Montesquieu hailed this set up as the most ideal and further vouched for its ability to secure liberty 
for all.136 But, this doctrine remains evasive. Marshall has described it as ‘one of the most 
confusing in the vocabulary of political and constitutional thought.’137 It has also been held that ‘in 
both theory and practice, it teems with subtleties, ironies and apparent contradictions.’138  
 
In essence, the French philosopher suggested what in practice would entail a watertight 
delineation of state functions. Some writers allege that this would be a misnomer in its ultimate.139 
It would denote, for instance, that members of the executive branch of government do not sit in the 
legislative organ or in the judiciary; it would mean that no organ of state performs the functions of 
another; and it would imply that no organ of state is allowed to interfere with the operations of 
another.140 Applied in this pure state, government would come to naught.141 The tripartite system 
would fail to function. True, rigid adherence to separated powers ‘in all cases would be subversive 
of the efficiency of the government, and result in the destruction of the public liberties.’ Of this 
controversy, Justice Jackson of the USA also ruled:142 
 
                                                 
133  Locke (n 7 above) ch.xii, 149. 
134  Editorial to Montesquieu’s translated treatise states: ‘It is he (Montesquieu), and not Locke, who must be called 
the father of the doctrine.’ Montesquieu (n 2 above) lvii.     
135  Montesquieu (n 2 above) xi, 6. 
136  As above. 
137  G Marshall Constitutional theory (1971) 97. 
138  Fisher (n 8 above) 217. 
139  OH Phillips & Jackson Constitutional and administrative law (2001) 12. 
140  Wade & Bradley (n 90 above) 24. 
141  Fisher (n 8 above) 217. 
142  n 5 above. 
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While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that the 
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches 
separateness but independence, autonomy but reciprocity.  
 
Contemporary writers agree that this is the proper interpretation to be given to Montesquieu’s idea. 
A scholarly contribution, thus, interprets the doctrine:143 
 
What the doctrine must be taken to advocate is the prevention of the tyranny by the conferment of 
too much power on any person or body, and the check of one power by another.   
 
It needs to be remembered that complete separation is possible neither in theory nor in practice.144 
 
There has been tremendous debate regarding whether the Westminster constitutional 
model thrives on the doctrine of separation of powers. According to Wade and Bradley, though the 
doctrine was based on a study of the Constitution of the UK, it is in the Constitution of the USA that 
its influence can best be seen.145 De Smith asserted that ‘no writer of repute would claim that it 
[separation of powers] is a central feature of the modern British constitution’146 while Marshall 
observed that ‘Montesquieu’s assertions… were inappropriate even when he made them’.147 
 
While these observations carry sufficient weight, it is not an exaggeration to state that the 
UK Constitution exhibits an attempt at dispersing the powers of state. Lord Steyn witnesses that:148 
 
The departments of state are Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary. Generally speaking 
Parliament is the supreme law-maker. The Executive carries on the business of the country. The 
Judiciary adjudicates on disputes between the state and individuals, and between individuals and 
corporations.  
 
In most Commonwealth constitutions in Africa, attempts have been made to secure these three 
branches of state. According to Udombana:149 
 
Postcolonial African States have strived to fashion themselves in the image of Western liberalism … 
The term “Modern State” is usually used to illustrate Western political philosophy that conceives 
government as comprised of three independent organs – the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary – functioning within a territory that is unambiguously defined. 
 
But some African states are quite unique. For instance, the Constitution of South Africa does 
recognize that State power could be shared between the Executive, Legislative, Judiciary and 
                                                 
143  Phillips & Jackson (n 139 above) 12. 
144  Bradley & Ewing (n 9 above) 58. 
145  Wade & Bradley (n 90 above) 25. 
146  de Smith (n 20 above) 41. 
147  Marshall (n 137 above) 97. 
148  Lord Steyn ‘Democracy, the rule of law and the role of judges’ (2006) European Human Rights Law Review 
246. 
149  See NJ Udombana ‘Articulating the right to democratic governance in Africa’ (2003) Summer Michigan Journal 
of International Law 1213. 
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other institutions supporting constitutional democracy.150 These ‘chapter 9’ institutions include: the 
Public Protector;151 the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC);152 the Commission for 
the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities;153 
the Commission for Gender Equality;154 the Auditor-General;155 and the Electoral Commission.156  
These institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law.  The law 
implies that no person or organ of state may interfere with their functioning.157  
 
Kenya has an overly powerful Executive, a Legislature, and a Judiciary whose 
independence is not expressly stated in the Constitution.158 A proposed draft constitution for Kenya 
had suggested independent constitutional commissions, which in practice would have amounted to 
an additional organ of state.159 A prominent institution in this regard would have been the 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice.160 
  
3.2.2 NHRIs in the ‘trinity’ waters 
Seemingly, with minimal exceptions, the tripartite system of checks and balances is well 
entrenched and the roles assigned to the various state organs almost universally understood. 
Thus, it is submitted that the installation of NHRIs in the tripartite configuration described above is 
bound to generate more confusion than symphony. It takes a four-pronged analysis to illustrate this 
submission.   
 
The first limb of argument concerns the apparent ‘usurping’ of mandates by NHRIs. It is 
accent that the international community has consigned to NHRIs tasks that have conventionally 
been reserved for the other organs of state. The power to conduct foreign relations, for example, is 
a jealously guarded prerogative in the Commonwealth that has been exercised mainly by the 
executive. In the most traditional sense, prerogatives could be described as ‘those inherent legal 
attributes, which are unique to the Crown.’161 They are inherent in so far as they are derived from 
customary common law.162 Contemporary Commonwealth practice has, however, evolved what 
has come to be known as ‘statutory prerogatives’ – prerogatives that are provided for by statutes 
as opposed to customary common law practice.163 Prerogatives usually consist of executive 
                                                 
150  The institutions supporting constitutional democracy are established under chapter 9 of the Constitution. 
151  Sec 181(1) (a). 
152  Sec 181(1) (b). 
153  Sec 181(1) (c). 
154  Sec 181(1) (d). 
155  Sec 181(1) (e). 
156  Sec 181(1) (f). 
157  Sec 181(4). 
158  Sec 23 of the Constitution establishes the Executive; sec 30 establishes the National Assembly; and sec 60 
establishes the Judiciary. Nothing is expressly stated regarding the independence of the Judiciary in the Constitution. 
159  Draft Bill of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 2002 , ch 17. 
160  Sec 288. 
161  de Smith (n 20 above) 114, 115. 
162  de Smith (n 20 above) 41. 
163  See, ‘prerogative powers’ in, J Ojwang Constitutional developments in Kenya: Institutional adaptation and social 
change (1990).  
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powers such as the conduct of foreign relations.164 Less wonder, by ‘acts of state’ are deemed 
‘those acts of the Crown which are done under the prerogative in the sphere of foreign affairs.’165 
Yet the Paris Principles turn a blind eye to this already established order by allotting NHRIs 
immense international mandate. It would appear the arrival of NHRIs reverses the trend since, 
henceforth, these human rights bodies are recognized actors on the international scene. They 
negotiate treaties, make reports concerning their states and have direct contacts with the UN and 
other international organizations.  
 
Even the making of laws, a role usually confided in parliament, often due to its 
representative capacity, has partly been assigned NHRIs. Emerging practice appears to confer 
NHRIs the right to participate in legislative deliberations particularly where human rights are 
implicated. The NHRIs movement has not spared the judicial branch of state, either. The second 
chapter noted that NHRIs invariably have the power to constitute judicial tribunals sometimes with 
the power to issue binding orders.  
 
Secondly, the composition of NHRIs is such that they could effectively alter the much 
vaunted trinity doctrine. According to the Paris Principles, even members of the executive and the 
legislative could share positions in NHRIs together with members of civil society groups. This 
implies that the differentiation of persons into separate organs is, again, here shaken and it is the 
doctrine of separation of powers that suffers. However, as a safeguard to the possibility of 
members of executive having a dominating voice in these bodies, where they sit in NHRIs, the 
Paris Principles provide that such members should not wield voting rights.  
 
It is instructive that the kind of prescribed autonomy for NHRIs, if faithfully pursued, could 
translate effectively into an additional organ of state. The distinctiveness of these outfits is marked 
by the fact that they are required to have constitutional or legislative establishment, financial and 
human resource independence and such powers as investigation of violations of human rights, 
power to summon even government officials as well as predetermined tenures for senior officials.  
The Constitution of South Africa has not shied away from stipulating that ‘chapter 9 institutions’ 
shall constitute an additional organ of state. A draft constitution of Kenya had attempted to follow 
suit and it is possible that these development might take root.      
 
But even as NHRIs begin to constitute independent outfits, at least according to the 
international standards, there is less talk concerning their accountability. The traditional state 
organs have at least accounted to each other and to the citizenry through the various established 
mechanisms such as judicial review, impeachment and vote of no confidence, universal adult 
suffrage et cetera. NHRIs have minimal checks and balances prescribed for them. As matters 
stand, they have no guarantee of elected membership, no reliable established convention of 
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transparency and accountability to either branch of state or the public and, worse still, little 
attention given to the rubric by constitutional law theory. Mostly, all that is required is that these 




This chapter has endeavored to demonstrate that there is incredible variance between the 
prevailing principles of constitutional law and the prescribed standards for NHRIs.  While it is 
acknowledged that the concept of the rule of law and the doctrine of separation of powers are not 
absolute, and also that the Paris Principles are not envisioned for wholesale implementation, the 
chapter has served to illustrate the fundamental problems potentially arising from the formulation of 
NHRIs. The tragedy with this kind of haphazard international development is that these seeds have 
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Plugging NHRIs into domestic sockets: Towards an accord 
 
Thus, the effort of the human rights movement, first, expanded the notions of what constitutes 
human rights and how states can encourage their enforcement; and second, worked toward 
the institutionalisation of human rights, whereby states can enforce activities relating to human 




Earlier sections of this thesis have alluded to the fact that the international community has had 
occasion to structure institutions to monitor human rights at national level. These externally created 
bodies – NHRIs – have been recommended for the national jurisdictions and their emergence 
would appear to have less factored the unique national experiences. One could safely state that 
they have been erected without prior consideration of the factors obtaining on the domestic ground 
on which they are meant to be sown. The result has been that there is already confusion regarding 
the manner in which the new institutions should be incorporated into the national configurations or 
whether at all they are necessary. This predicament has been lamented:169 
 
The fact that the institutions outlined in the Paris Principles did not fit easily in the traditional three-
division of state powers but appeared to have a role in both the legislative, judicial and executive 
field, must have confused many governments.    
 
The current chapter is an attempt at resolving some of the most nagging questions this contribution 
promised, at the outset, to address: (a) Are NHRIs necessary where an effective tripartite system 
of government under the rule of law prevails? (b) If in the affirmative, how should these institutions 
be incorporated into the conventional system? (c) How could NHRIs  be made accountable? 
 
 
                                                 
168  CR Kumar ‘National human rights institutions; Good governance perspectives on institutionalisation of human 
rights’ (2003) American University International Law Review 260.  
169  Pohjolainen (n 32 above) 8.  
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4.1 NHRIs: Superfluous or necessary tautology?  
 
It is accent that the tripartite government structure is seen as a guarantor of liberties. The advent of 
NHRIs would seem to confront this established order in at least two prominent respects. Firstly, 
this development raises the question as to whether the original tripartite framework has failed to 
secure the desired ends and hence the need for fortification. Secondly, the situation is least helped 
by the fact that NHRIs have been assigned some of the roles conventionally performed by the 
other organs of state. It would, therefore, be pertinent to interrogate whether these new outfits are 
complementary or substitutes, or, indeed, whether they are necessary and feasible at all.  
 
In this connection, it is submitted that there are many reasons why the NHRIs movement 
should be given a chance even during the sustenance of the tripartite government. The reasons 
are that: The ancient tripartite government structure is less accustomed to emerging species of 
rights; that norm setting in matters human rights has since taken a tangent, mandating novel and 
apt measures; and that the development is in line with the contemporary agenda of mainstreaming 
human rights concerns. The thesis now turns to discuss these justifications.  
  
4.1.1 Tripartite government: Obsolete or inadequate? 
 
It serves to reiterate that believers in trinity government have variously vouched for the potential of 
this set up to concede liberty for all.  Few contest, for instance, that a representative and supreme 
legislature can put the executive to task, hence yielding liberty for the citizenry. Where usurpations 
under the law arise, an independent judiciary has usually offered an impartial arbiter.  In a 
democratic dispensation, even the executive itself is amenable to further checks by the populace 
mostly through periodic and fair elections. Liberty, it would appear, oozes naturally from this 
configuration rife with checks and balances. Bolingbroke, a contemporary of Montesquieu, is a 
bigoted believer in this ‘holy trinity’. According to his philosophy:170 
 
It is division of powers… which constitutes a limited monarchy…. If any of the three … should at any 
time usurp more power than the law gives, or make ill use of a legal power, the other two parts 
may… by exerting their strength, reduce this power into proper bounds. This is that balance which 
has been so much talked of…. This proposition is therefore true; that in a constitution like ours, the 
safety of whole depends on the balance of its parts. 
 
                                                 
170  Bolingbroke Remarks on the history of England (1730). 
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A convincing argument, indeed, is made that, as regard human rights protection, the trinity 
configuration is omnipotent. It is submitted that this is a façade as a deeper understanding of the 
factors at play accentuates a revealing facet. For example, it is hardly reckoned that Montesquieu 
and ilk, in propagating the trinity doctrine, also ventured to define the gene of liberty expected to 
accrue from the tripartite government set up. In Montesquieu’s own words:171  
 
Political liberty does not consist in an unrestrained freedom. In governments, that is, in societies 
directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being 
constraint to do what we ought to will.  
 
Even the most generous interpretation of the context reveals that Montesquieu could only have 
considered political liberties. His own words expressly refer to political liberties and it is clear that 
political freedom is what preoccupies his thinking. Put differently, it is least likely that Montesquieu 
prescribed an institutional solution to entitlements other than civil and political.  
 
A different line of deduction could yield the same synthesis. According to Karel Vasak, 
human rights unveiled at distinct epochs.172 First to be ascertained were civil and political rights 
(first generation rights), followed by social and economic rights (second generation rights), and 
finally group rights (third generation rights). Although this categorisation of rights into epochs has 
been contested, the thinking serves to illustrate that only civil and political rights could have 
informed the initial stages of defining the state, especially during the 17th Century. This argument 
finds exoneration as Heyns and Brand confirm that: ‘the inclusion of socio-economic rights in 
national constitutions is a relatively recent development.’173     
 
It is, thus, clear that recent developments on the human rights front have introduced other 
species of human rights not prevalent when the original state was under formulation. Social and 
economic rights, for instance, attained international recognition by dint of the UDHR and especially 
after the International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).174 Much more 
prominence was given to social and economic rights during the Vienna Conference where the 
indivisibility, interrelation, inalienability and interconnectivity of human rights was asserted.175 At 
Maastricht, human rights experts declared that:176 
 
                                                 
171  Montesquieu xi 3. Emphasis added. 
172  The categorization of rights into different generations is ascribed to the French jurist Karel Vasak. See, M 
Craston ‘What are human rights?’ in L Lacqueur & B Rubin (eds ) The human rights reader (1979) 21. 
173  C Heyns & D Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ G Bekker (ed) A 
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174  Adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 1966; entered into force on 3 
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175  Para 8. 
176  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para 4. 
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It is now undisputed that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and of equal 
importance for human dignity. Therefore, states are as responsible for violations of economic, social 
and cultural rights as they are for violations of civil and political rights. 
 
Recently, national jurisdictions have begun to incorporate these novel entitlements into domestic 
bills of rights. The Constitution of South Africa has a Bill of Rights with justiciable social and 
economic rights, a very unique development.177 A scholarly contribution has in fact ranked this 
Constitution as ‘the most sophisticated and comprehensive system for the protection of socio-
economic rights of all constitutions in the world today.’178  
 
These new human entitlements are different both in their content and nature. While civil 
and political rights will usually require the massive and oft bothersome hand of the state to remain 
in the abeyance, social and economic rights yearn for active involvement of government in 
guaranteeing the stipulated good and services. Rosas and Scheinin write that:179 
 
Civil and political rights… only require the State to abstain from interfering in the life of the individual 
(‘negative’ obligation of the State). Economic, social and cultural rights are often seen as objectives 
or ‘programmatic’ rights rather than true individual rights. They are said to require ‘positive’ action on 
the part of the State (national policies and programmes), such as the handing out of money and 
services.  
 
In the light of the foregoing, it is logical that a government superstructure cast against the backdrop 
of civil and political rights, which rights thrive on the abeyance of government, is bound to prove 
inadequate in the implementation of social and economic rights, which vigorously beckon state 
action. Clearly, these new entitlements call for a reconstituted state that reckons these 
developments. In this regard, NHRIs are seen as potentially sealing the lacunae.   
 
According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, NHRIs made in the 
image of the Paris Principles have an important role to play in the implementation of social and 
economic rights. It is the Committee’s holding that ‘one such means, through which important steps 
can be taken, is the work of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.’180 The Committee is also of the opinion that institutions at national level in the nature of 
                                                 
177  Other states with a justiciable set of social and economic rights are Sri Lanka, Hungary, Lithuania and Portugal.   
178  D Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ in D Brand & C Heyns in Socio-
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NHRIs have a better disposition to promote the indivisibility and interdependence of all human 
rights.181 Kumar embraces a similar position thus:182 
 
… The role of NHRIs should be to narrow the differences between these two sets of rights so that 
public policy goals of economic and social development become assertive and enforceable rights for 
the empowerment of the citizens.   
 
A report has further recommended that NHRIs ought to have a mandate to address economic, 
social and cultural rights.183 These could be achieved, for instance, through auditing governments’ 
policies to ensure that they realise economic, social and cultural rights, addressing cases involving 
economic, social and cultural rights in terms of government treaty obligations and looking for ways 
of making these rights justiciable.184  Moreover, given the domestic stationing of NHRIs, they are in 
a better position to formulate the core minimum obligations necessary for the realisation of social 
and economic rights.185 In South Africa, courts of law have already found the SAHRC a worthy 
partner in the enforcement of these fairly nascent entitlements.186 
 
4.1.2 Emergence of the international stage as norm setting forum  
 
Not only have new entitlements emerged, but also national jurisdictions as norms setting scenes 
have weathered drastically quite to the chagrin of the tripartite doctrine. State sovereignty has 
weaned almost in the same proportion that the international stage has gained prominence in 
enacting human rights laws and standards.  
 
Since the birth of the UN on 24 October 1945,187 it became clear that norm setting in 
matters concerning human rights would no longer chiefly be the domains of national apparatus but, 
rather, also of the international community. This statement is vindicated by the fact that within one 
year of UN’s existence, it had already entrenched the Charter-based ECOSOC,188 which in turn 
hastily instituted UNCHR.189 These institutions together with the General Assembly and other 
affiliate bodies of the UN would then provide the grass on which human rights soccer would be 
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played. They would constitute a forum parallel to that of national jurisdictions; but a no mean 
forum, nevertheless.  
 
It is instructive that the UN Charter itself had paid sufficient tribute to the concept of human 
rights. Preambular paragraph 2 of the Charter reaffirms ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person’ and ‘in the equal rights of men and women.’ Article 1(3) of 
the Charter identifies one of the purposes of the UN as being: 
 
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.  
 
In furtherance of this mission, the General Assembly, in 1948, endorsed what has been described 
as a landmark in human rights’ history, the UDHR. That this instrument represents a turning point 
for human rights is evidenced by the fact that some commentators even concede that it has since 
ossified into customary international law.190 This influential international instrument was followed in 
1966 by two treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)191 and the 
CESCR. These three instruments are considered so cardinal that they have come to constitute 
what is known as the ‘International Bill Rights.’192  
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW)193 is another treaty whose prominence has been on steady escalation. It has been hailed 
in many quotas. For instance, it has been noted that ’the outcome of years of discussions, debates 
and ultimately compromises, the Convention asserts many of the fundamental rights of women.’194 
In yet another context, it has been described as constituting ‘a comprehensive attempt at 
establishing universal standards on the rights of women’ and further that it ‘can be regarded as a 
milestone on the path to the goal of standard-setting for gender-based equality.’195  
 
The same happy story of increasing significance could be said of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC),196 which boasts of a near universal endorsement.197 It is ‘the most 
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rapidly and universally accepted human rights document in the history of international law.’198 It 
could be argued that this universal ratification signifies an emerging norm of jus cogens. 
 
It is possible to describe the human rights movement within the UN as a normative 
bandwagon, which has not been averse to novel interests.199 It is a truism that the UN human 
rights system has been expanding to incorporate other concerns of human rights import when they 
garner international recognition and acceptance. The latest entrant in this bandwagon is the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families (CMW).200  
 
Accordingly, these hallowed norms, set at the international level, are now ideals to which 
national jurisdictions are expected to conform. This change of human rights strategy in terms of the 
forums and institutions involved certainly calls for a realignment of structural items on the municipal 
front. This development makes a self evident case for NHRIs even in the lifetime of democratic 
dispensations upholding the doctrine of separation of powers.   
 
4.1.3 NHRIs as part of mainstreaming of human rights 
 
At the instance when the modern state was under formulation, human rights were not prominent. 
As stated above, it is only after the establishment of the UN that the human rights discourse 
acquired both status and urgency. The status attained is that of an imperative and the urgency that 
of protection and promotion. The UDHR had set the tempo by recognising that ‘the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world’.201 Based on this premises, the General Assembly had 
then proclaimed the UDHR:202 
 
A common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual 
and every organ of society… shall strive… to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance…. 
 
Since this momentous proclamation, there has been a tendency to mainstream human rights in all 
manner of governance aspects. In 1993, the Vienna Declaration considered that the promotion and 
protection of human rights is a matter of priority, further asserting the prominence of human rights.  
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Given the special concern now afforded the human rights discourse, specialised care for 
this subject has been rightly claimed. Obviously, the establishment of specialised human rights 
institutions to assist in the protection and promotion of human rights are a natural outcome of the 
human rights mainstreaming exercise. This development of NHRIs has been seen as potentially 
contribution ‘towards the establishment of a fresh constitutional order in which human rights are 
widely known and fully respected.’203  Therefore, the establishment of NHRIs should be seen as a 
natural correlative to the prominent status attained by the human rights discourse.  
 
4.2 Possible relationship between NHRIs and other organs of state 
 
The present section has the modest object of resolving the potential conflict between NHRIs and 
the other organs of state. The section contends that neither the tripartite government structure nor 
NHRIs should be seen as a threat to the other. It is submitted that NHRIs should not compete for 
the democratic space that has been hitherto within the province of legislature, executive, and 
judiciary.204 At the same time, NHRIs should continue to be accorded democratic space to continue 
their independent functions in fulfilling the mandate to protect and promote human rights.205 The 
rationale for such separate space has been given as to elevate the discussion of human rights 
from policy guidelines to central political principles.206  
 
Moreover, unique human rights tasks have emerged and ipso facto new performers are 
called for. A writer has best captured this uniqueness: 207 
 
The United Nations views NHRIs as useful contacts within their respective countries on human rights 
matters. It is important to emphasize the uniqueness of this contact, as it is fundamentally different 
from that with other pre-existing sources and manifestations of states and their instrumentalities, 
including legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 
 
The new human rights undertakings performed by NHRIs are both queer and entailing in at least 
three cardinal regards. Firstly, the new tasks call for institutions that are capable of both formal 
undertakings such as constituting human rights tribunals as well as informal mandates such as 
teaching and sensitizing the public on human rights. Secondly, sought after are institutions with 
national stationing yet rife with international obligations and contacts. Thirdly, there are needed 
institutions that are both civil society soluble (in order to have an impact with the members of the 
public) as well as semi bureaucratic to be able to influence the usually conservative officialdom.  
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These unique traits have no rivals in the conventional state configuration pressing the need 
for coexistence of both the tripartite government and NHRIs. For instance, while the judiciary has 
often been entrusted with the task of determining disputes, its overtly formal stature as well as its 
strict adherence to rigid fibers of procedures inevitably paves way for NHRIs, which are mostly 
sufficiently flexible. Human rights imperatives appear to call for such flexibility. Sometimes, the 
reparations needed may just be in form of reconciliation or simply a declaration of a violation and it 
is NHRIs, and not courts of law, that are equipped for this kind of undertaking. Another limitation of 
the court would be its inability to act suo motu. Courts have to wait until a violation of rights is 
lodged with them before they can give a usually predetermined verdict. NHRIs beat this deadlock 
in that they have both the competence and ability to institute investigations on their own motion 
even without being moved.  They could also easily secure an amicable settlement. 
 
A symbiotic relationship is also possible with parliaments. According to the Abuja 
Guidelines, NHRIs are to feed parliamentarians with the necessary advice when enacting 
legislation or passing motions that may have impact on the state of human rights. Accordingly, 
NHRIs ought to advise parliamentarians on the human rights implications of all proposed 
legislations as well as existing laws. NHRIs could also provide on-going training for 
parliamentarians on human rights principles. It is equally encouraged that NHRIs conduct research 
on human rights issues and share the same with parliamentarians. The Abuja Declaration also 
recommended that NHRIs assist parliament in the creation of its committees for furtherance of 
human rights. 
 
The point is made that there is no cause of worry – all that is needed is symphony and 
efficiency. There are separate roles curved out for each of these institutions and only optimal uses 
rather than duplication and conflict should be sort. 
  
4.3 Towards accountability for NHRIs  
 
There is no gainsaying that the Paris Principles, if implemented to the letter and spirit, could 
potentially foster institutions more powerful than most other organs of state. The resultant 
institutions are bound to be autonomous and enjoying relatively wide mandates both on the 
national and international scenes. Matshekga has vaunted this autonomy:208 
 
Independence is one of the yardsticks against which the competence of a national human rights 
institution as an effective mechanism for the protection and promotion of human rights is to be 
tested.  
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Unfortunately, discussion has tended to focus more on how to guarantee the independence of 
NHRIs with less attention being devoted to the question how they are to be held accountable.209 
Yet, if these human rights bastions are to conform to the established principles of democratic 
governance, it is vital that they, too, be subjected to checks and balances. Devoid of accountability, 
NHRIs would remain paper tigers, thereby aggravating the frustration and disillusionment of victims 
of human rights violation and society as a whole.210 This state of affairs is counterproductive and 
could be a daring affront to the rule of law.   
 
Ancient wisdom would appear to enunciate that only power could check another. In this 
regard, Montesquieu did prescribe that to prevent abuse of power, ‘it is necessary from the nature 
of things that power should be a check to power’.211 Of this idea, it has been stated:212 
  
According to him (Montesquieu), power can be checked only by power – a statement with which few 
will be willing to quarrel. It is not ideologies and beliefs that can check power but only a counter-
power. 
 
The tragedy with this kind of accountability mechanism for NHRIs would be that it might end up 
compromising their independence. Yet their efficacy very much depends on their institutional 
autonomy as well as independence from the other organs of state. Even then, guarding the 
autonomy of NHRIs should not be interpreted to mean insulating them from transparency regarding 
their performance. The effectiveness of these institutions could be improved if a sound 
accountability mechanism is erected.  
 
Currently, in the Commonwealth, most NHRIs are required to account by submitting annual 
reports of their activities to parliament or head of state or government.213 This system, research 
shows, has been a failure in at least three irking respects. Firstly, the reports presented to the 
legislatures are hardly detailed.214 They tend to contain the very hollow administrative and financial 
operations of the human rights institutions, which reports give no clue of the performance 
pertaining to the period under review. Secondly, the reports are mostly belated; often containing 
activities whose social and political ‘gestation period’ has lapsed.215 Thirdly, legislatures rarely pay 
attention to the content of these reports due to a combination factors. For instance, there is, 
mostly, no obligation on the legislature to debate the report and it would appear that almost 
invariably they are effectively ignored.216 Also, many parliaments are weak in their composition 217 
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and many wallow in a myriad of institutional trappings. The result is that institutions have emerged 
which are not yet amenable to a proper system of accountability. 
 
 According to Hatchard et al this vexing state of affairs could be fixed.218 This could be by 
placing NHRIs under a legal obligation to submit their annual reports to parliament or head of state 
or government within a specific time. The law could also obligate parliament to debate the 
document that is the report of NHRIs. A further measure would be to require officials of NHRIs to 
appear regularly before appropriate parliamentary committees to discuss their report and the 
institution’s operations. Such an exercise stands to be more successful if participants from civil 
society groups are invited to also give their side of the story. Hatchard et al further suggest that as 
an alternative:219 
 
Parliament might consider establishing a formal advisory committee on national institutions whose 
responsibilities would include holding regular consultations with civil society groups and with 
members of the institution itself as well as providing advice, support, encouragement and, where 
necessary, criticism as to its operations.  
 
These recommendations may well restore the institutional checks currently in abeyance. But given 
the queer nature of NHRIs, other innovative methods of answerability also ought to be considered. 
Answerability, in this regard, is double edged:220 
 
It is partly about creating a line of authority that will ensure the national institution can do its job 
without interference from those whom it is trying to hold to account. It is also about ensuring that the 
institution’s clientele – the public at large – are able to see what it is doing in their name and ensure 
it is performing properly. 
 
Since NHRIs are specifically for the good of members of the public, it is wise that this group 
constitutes the first most critical check on their performance. In this regard, NHRIs may be called 
upon to make detailed reports and circulate them widely to members of the public through mass 
media.221 These reports should detail the activities of the NHRI in question as well as the 
objectives, achievements and challenges. In other words, all activities and aspects of NHRIs 
should be explained to members of the public possibly in the language that they understand. By 
functioning in a transparent and effective manner, the public can hold NHRIs accountable for their 
actions.222 
 
According to Reif, where there is established more than one class of NHRIs, it is prudent 
that these institutions check each other.223 For example, where there is both an ombudsman and a 
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human rights commission in a territory, the ombudsman may have the jurisdiction to investigate 
complaints of maladministration made against the human rights commission.224 This contribution 
finds this alternative tenable, as it is a proper case of power checking another. Yet cleverly it 
abhors dependence on the ordinary organs of state, like the executive, whose agenda is often 
suspect.  
 
The other pliable system of accountability could be independent external audits that 
evaluate the impact of NHRIs. This could be in the form of audit reports not just confined to 
evaluate financial and administrative functions of the NHRIs, but also to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the procedures employed by NHRIs.225 These measures, if put to effect, could, arguably, 
eradicate the problems already witnessed regarding the accountability of NHRIs. 
 
4.4 Conclusion and recommendations 
 
This contribution has noted that concerns have been raised regarding the potential conflict 
between NHRIs and the conventional organs of state. The conflict arises because these new 
bodies have been conceptualized at the international level, an eventuality that has not allowed for 
municipal adjustments or convention. Thus, institutions are now conceptualized which 
constitutional law has had little time to consider. 
 
Questions have been asked whether these bodies are necessary at all. It is the thesis here 
that these bodies are needed for at least three prominent reasons. Firstly, new entitlements, for 
instance, social and economic rights have emerged which rights were not anticipated at the time of 
formulation of the conventional constitutional structures. Indeed, it is now trite that the tripartite 
configuration was an institutional solution largely to civil and political rights. A change in human 
rights strategy has, therefore, become necessary. Secondly, there is a change in the forum for 
human rights norm setting. Human rights matters are now both international and municipal and 
their enforcement would, therefore, mandate queer bodies with both national and international 
contacts. Thirdly, it is only natural that the current human rights mainstreaming exercise be 
supplemented with specialized institutions to promote and protect human rights.  
 
Regarding how to resolve the possible misunderstandings of the functions of NHRIs in 
relation to the other organs of state, it is suggested that well defined mandates for NHRIs should 
be able to abhor such confusion. The argument here is that each of the state organs has its own 
roles and democratic space. Further, the functions required to be performed by NHRIs have no 
rivals on the national scene. Each of these organs should, therefore, be allowed democratic space 
to realize their mandates.   
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Thirdly, there is need to put in place proper systems and conventions for accountability for 
NHRIs. This may be by enhancing accounting to parliament, and the involvement of members of 
the public and other autonomous bodies not part of the mainstream government. 
 
Suffice to state, if the loose bolts are fastened, the imperative of human rights protection 
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